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with Special Reference to the Case of Watsuji Tetsurō
(1889–1960)1  
INAGA Shigemi
From 1860 up until 1960 Japanese intellectuals habitually travelled to Europe 
to absorb the latest Western scholarship. Philosophers were no exception. Going 
to the West was an intellectual and institutional duty to legitimize one’s posi-
tion in the Ivory Tower of the imperial universities. Fūdo by Watsuji Tetsurō 
(1889–1960) merits consideration as the outcome of his stay in the West 
(1927–28). Chronologically, the book was inspired by Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit 
(1927) and Dilthey’s Gesammelte Shriften (1927). Watsuji modifies Heidegger’s 
thinking on Zeitlichkeit, replacing his Sein zum Tode with Sein zum Leben in 
the footsteps of Dilthey. e author also contrasts Japanese and Western culture 
(monsoon and meadow), while separating East and West by the arid desert 
area located in between. Watsuji’s ref lection on humans’ relationship with 
nature (Fūdo) was also his reply to Karl Marx. He confronted Marx’s theory on 
Entfremdung with Heidegger’s idea of Zuhandensein and rehabilitated Mitsein 
so as to elaborate his own idea of Sittlichkeit, or the ethics of an idealized 
Gemeinschaft. This paper seeks to elucidate the extent to which his trip to the 
West affected his ideas. The sightseeing on his way to Europe stimulated his 
intuitive observations. Numerous letters sent to his wife and children in Japan 
served as the germinating core of Fūdo. Instead of analyzing Watsuji’s Fūdo 
as a stereotypical and outdated example of climatic determinism, this paper 
elucidates historical as well as spatial conditions by which Japanese Philosophy 
established itself as an academic discipline in pre-war Japan.
Keywords: Watsuji Tetsurō, Fūdo, climate, philosophy, Martin Heidegger, 
Wilhelm Dilthey, Ernst Cassirer, Kuki Shūzō, Zeitlichkeit, Raumlichkeit
1 This paper was first read at the international conference “Japanese Philosophy as an Academic Discipline: 
Research and Teaching,” held at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 10–11 December 2011. This paper 
is not intended as a philosophical study. Rather, the author merely aims to shed some light on the cultural 
background surrounding the making of Watsuji’s Fūdo by placing him within the history of maritime trips 
in the modern period. The author wishes to express his gratitude to the two anonymous referees for their 
constructive and highly detailed philological comments, as well as to Anton Luis Sevilla, who edited the 
language and style of the draft. 
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Philosophy has always come from abroad. And Japan was alien to it.2 From 1860 up until 
1960, Japanese intellectuals adopted the habit of travelling to Europe to absorb the latest 
Western scholarship. Philosophers were no exception. In order to make an academic 
career in Japan, going to the West was a sine qua non. It was an intellectual as well as an 
institutional imperative, essential to legitimizing one’s position in the ivory tower of the 
imperial universities. In this context, let us consider the case of Watsuji Tetsurō 和辻哲郎 
(1889–1960) and Fūdo 風土, one of Watsuji’s most popular books, which is regarded as a 
classic to this day. Being the outcome of his maritime trip to the West and his stay there 
from 1927–28, the book is important both in its chronology and in its treatment of human 
climates. Chronologically, the book was inspired by the publication of Martin Heidegger’s 
Sein und Zeit (1927), as well as Wilhelm Dilthey’s posthumous Gesammelte Shriften (1927). 
While modifying Heidegger’s thinking on Zeitlichkeit (temporality) into an anthropology of 
Raumlichkeit (spatiality), Watsuji replaces Heidegger’s Sein zum Tode (Being-toward-death) 
with his idea of Sein zum Leben (Being-toward-life) in the footsteps of Dilthey. By way 
of climatic typology, the Japanese philosopher at the same time tries to contrast Japanese 
culture (monsoon) with Western culture (meadow), while separating the West from the East 
by the arid desert area located in between. His ideas were to be criticized as stereotypical 
and outdated by Umesao Tadao 梅棹忠夫 (1920–2010) who proposed, instead, an ecological 
approach of dynamic succession in his Bunmei no seitai shikan 文明の生態史観 (1957). 
Watsuji’s reflection on humankind’s relationship (Verhältniss) with nature, which he 
calls fūdo (by definition an interface between humankind and nature) was also his reply to 
Karl Marx’s Deutsche Ideologie which had recently become accessible in 1926. He confronted 
Marx’s theory of Entfremdung or alienation (the German original was well-known in pre-
war Japan) with Heidegger’s idea of Zeug (tool) (or, for Watsuji, dōgu 道具), from which 
the German philosopher derives the idea of Zuhandenheit (readiness-to-hand), and he 
rehabilitated Mitsein (Being-with) so as to elaborate his own idea of the ethics of an ideal-
ized Gemeinschaft (for which he employs the term Sittlichkeit). In so doing, Watsuji refers to 
Hegel’s work Grundlinien der Philosophie der Rechts (1821).3 
is paper tries to elucidate the extent to which Watsuji’s trip to the West by steamship 
affected his ideas. is will be done through a comparative and interdisciplinary, but not 
philosophical, approach toward intellectual history. Sightseeing on his way to Europe stimu-
lated Watsuji’s intuitive observations. Numerous letters he sent to his wife and children back 
in Japan served as the germinating core of the publication. Instead of analyzing Watsuji’s 
Fūdo as a stereotypical and outdated example of climatic determinism (for which it has been 
often criticized), this paper explores the historical as well as geographic and climatic condi-
tions (as Watsuji himself intended in the book), in which Japanese philosophy established 
itself as an academic discipline during the prewar period.  
2 This statement is made cautiously, knowing that it may cause interminable controversies. The present author 
shall not repeat those controversies here, as he has already published an essay tracking a critical outline of the 
issue, encompassing Japan, China and Korea. See Inaga 2011. 
3 This paragraph summarizes the general schema, which will be examined in detail below. As is already evident, 
there is a huge discrepancy between the Japanese translation and the English translation of the same German 
philosophical terms. We lose sight of the divergence between the two, and we risk annulling the transcultural 
migration of the signification, if we replace the Japanese translation automatically with its English equivalent. 
The same applies to the use of Chinese characters for original German terms. In this paper, I therefore retain 
the original German and Japanese alongside the English. On the gap between the German original and its 
English replacement, see Didi-Huberman 2002, pp. 433–51.
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1.  Travel to the West in Modernizing Japan: An Overview
Shibusawa Ei’ichi 渋澤栄一 (1840–1931) was one of the first Japanese to witness the Suez 
Canal under construction. Shibusawa crossed the Isthmus in 1867 when he accompanied 
Tokugawa Akitake 徳川昭武 (1853–1910), representative of the Tokugawa shogunate, on his 
mission to Europe on the occasion of the Exposition universelle in Paris. Shibusawa observed 
that the opening of the canal would enable a direct passage between the East and the West, 
and that it would accelerate commercial transactions, multiplying economic profits.4 Five 
years earlier, Fukuzawa Yukichi 福澤諭吉 (1835–1901) had seen the port town of Baletta in 
Malta. Located between Sicily and Tunisia, the island of Malta had been taken over by the 
British following its victory against France in 1801. Summarizing these geopolitical facts 
and enumerating statistical data, Fukuzawa accounted for its strategic importance. This 
Japanese samurai’s meticulous observations detailed the abundance of military hardware in 
the naval base. Touching upon military secrets, he concluded that Malta must be the most 
important fortress in the Mediterranean Sea, and reported that the food supply there was 
enough to nourish four thousand soldiers for seven years.5 
While Shibusawa was captivated by the efficiency in transportation and took interest 
in commercial profitability, Fukuzawa cast a watchful eye on the British command over 
the sea. By taking a route westward to Europe via Singapore, Ceylon, Suez and Malta, 
the Japanese could not help observe the plain fact that the entire itinerary to Europe was 
under British control. e more one advanced to the West, the stronger one felt the glory 
of the British empire. Both Fukuzawa and Shibusawa testified to this. e impression left 
on travellers by the eastward course was quite different. Crossing the Pacific Ocean to the 
American West coast, and disembarking in San Francisco, one confronted the American 
Western frontier, as was witnessed by participants in the Kanrin maru 咸臨丸 voyage in 
1860 and the Iwakura 岩倉 mission in 1871.6 
It was almost forty years later in 1900 that Natsume Sōseki 夏目漱石 (1867–1916) 
set sail for London. On his way to Europe, the future novelist crossed paths with another 
Japanese sailing the Indian Ocean in the opposite direction, without either noticing the 
other. Minakata Kumagusu 南方熊楠 (1867–1941) happened to be on his way back to Japan. 
Minakata had arrived in North America in 1886 at the age of eighteen, and had spent more 
than ten years in London. One might not be able to explain the difference in behavior of the 
two Japanese only by their itinerary, of course; other factors have to be considered. While 
Kumagusu was young enough to adapt himself to Anglo-Saxon society, Sōseki was already 
too old to feel at ease in London. Yet one may be surprised to see the contrast. Kumagusu was 
proud of the friendships he was able to establish among Western scholars and naturalists at 
the British Library, but Sōseki suffered from mental depression in his self-imposed isolation. 
Sōseki’s inferiority complex is often explained by his excessive sense of duty as a 
government sponsored scholar from Japan. Yet one of his letters written on board the 
German ship Preußen and sent to his friend Takahama Kyoshi 高濱虚子 (1874–1954) 
from Hong Kong clearly shows that his lack of adaptability was there from the beginning. 
“e presence of the Chinese people, the Western bath and toilet are unbearable. I wish I 
4 Shibusawa 1967, pp. 31–33.
5 Fukuzawa 1958, pp. 17–18. See also Haga 1968.
6 For a general overview of the establishment of the route to Europe, see Sonoda 2003. Also, for the 
transformation of westward journeys in Japanese modernity, Ōkubo 2008 is accurate and accessible.
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could sip a cup of tea with rice (ochazuke) and take a bowl of soba noodles again as soon as 
possible, getting rid of this infernal confinement.”7 One may wonder if Sōseki’s uneasiness 
may have been alleviated by a stay in North America before coming to London. He arrived 
in the capital during the second Boer War, and this coincidence was traumatic for him.
 
2.  Watsuji Tetsurō or “A Stay in the West is No Longer Necessary”
It was sixty five years after Fukuzawa and sixty years after Shibusawa, that Watsuji set sail 
to Europe in 1927 (Figures 1 and 2). A quarter century had already passed since Kumagusu 
and Sōseki had been in London. Watsuji, then aged thirty eight, took the NYK vessel 
Hakusan maru 白山丸. On their way to Marseille, the passengers on board were able to 
enjoy the same Japanese lifestyle as they had back home.8 Watsuji was thus spared the kind 
of alienation Natsume Sōseki had to suffer on board an unfamiliar German ship. Watsuji 
also participated in scheduled sightseeing trips at almost each port of call.
Since the end of World War I, the safety of navigation across the Indian Ocean and 
the Mediterranean Sea had improved, and passage to Europe had become fashionable 
among wealthy, high-ranking people. Such concerns for nation-state building and alarmed 
comments on the military dominance of the British Empire (as we observed in Shibusawa’s 
and Fukuzawa’s writings) were no longer conspicuous in post war travel writings.9 Hyper-
inflation in postwar Europe, and especially in defeated Germany, made it relatively easy for 
upper-middle class Japanese to make a prolonged stay in the West.
However, the time of peace between the two world wars was short-lived. The Great 
Kantō Earthquake 関東大震災 in 1923 had devastated the capital area. The stagnating 
economic depression finally resulted in the Wall Street financial Crisis of 1929. In the 
1930s, the world system established by the Versailles Treaties rapidly lost its stability. e 
second decade of the Shōwa 昭和 era (1926–1989), the Japanese incursion into the Chinese 
continent in the Manchuria Incident of 1931 and the “China Incident” in 1937 heightened 
international tensions. Ultra-nationalistic discourse prevailed across the world, and spread 
hand in hand with soaring economic protectionism. In Japan, apprehension about British 
maritime hegemony reasserted itself, and the sense of threat also intensified before strong 
American influence, as it expanded throughout the Pacific Ocean.
is outline of the world economic and political situations allows us to observe that 
Watsuji travelled to Europe in the last moments of interwar peace. Watsuji, whose early 
pioneering studies on Nietzsche and Kierkegaard had been well received by the academic 
world, was then associate professor at Kyoto Imperial University. He had already enjoyed 
considerable fame, thanks to the popular success of such bestsellers as Koji junrei 古寺巡礼 
(1919) and academic works represented by Nihon seishinshi kenkyū 日本精神史研究 (1926). 
It was then a duty of imperial university associate professors to stay in Europe before their 
promotion to professorship. Watsuji had to fulfill this institutional requirement. He had 
failed to go abroad as a youngster, and was unwilling to do so at the age of thirty seven. 
He was too old to adapt himself to foreign soil with the maiden-like sensibility that Mori 
7 Letter 199 (presumably 19 September 1900) in Natsume 1996, vol. 22, p. 189. Cf. Ōkubo 2008, p. 50 and 
Takeda 2001, pp. 141–43.
8 For the influence of World War I on maritime navigation and the development of commercial shipping during 
the period, see Ishidō 1975.  
9 See Ōhashi 2001, p. 122.
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Figure 1. Watsuji Tetsurō’s, pass for the museums in Rome, 1928.
Figure 2. Watsuji’s itinerary in Europe.
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Ōgai 森鷗外 (1862–1922) had once proudly demonstrated. Indeed, Watsuji was fearful 
of his succumbing to the “neurosis” that had aﬄicted many of his predecessors (including 
Natsume Sōseki, who had by then gained a reputation as the nation’s novelist). Rather, 
Watsuji wished he could remain in Japan with his beloved wife and family, and hated the 
idea of being forced to live alone in a foreign country. From the outset, he thought it useless 
to go abroad and did not expect much to learn Philosophie from his stay in Germany.10 
Shortly after his arrival in Berlin, Watsuji reported to his superior colleague, Tanabe 
Hajime 田邊元 (1885–1962), that he was “quite disappointed with the lectures at the Berlin 
University” (3 June 1927).11 He also confessed to the editor, Iwanami Shigeo 岩波茂雄 
(1881–1946), that “comprehensible lectures are too simple and boring, while lectures I can-
not understand, because they are too speedy, are by definition useless to listen to.”12 ough 
he found his German speaking ability insufficient, he felt the academic lectures were not 
satisfactory as far as he could understand them, and he gave up listening to them within two 
weeks. is is a typical reaction of adult intellectuals who are highly cultured but remain 
too feeble in listening. As Plato formulated it in Menon, one cannot find what one searches 
for, because if one knows what one is searching for, the search is no longer necessary. At 
the same time, one cannot find what one does not know, simply because one cannot know 
what search is needed. Obviously Watsuji was caught in this paradox of Menon, as Michael 
Polanyi inventively paraphrased it in his discussion in e Tacit Dimension.13
As for aversion to conversation, Watsuji’s case reminds us of Natsume Sōseki’s com-
plaint: “What I hate most is trying to be sociable by making use of my English, which is 
completely lacking in eloquence.”14 Takeda Atsushi 竹田敦, who meticulously examined the 
lives and deeds of the teachers belonging to the so-called Kyoto School of Philosophy, finds 
Watsuji exceptional among them in that his writing in Europe has a genuine human touch 
(ningenmi 人間味) about it.15 However, as Karube Tadashi 苅部直 judiciously remarks, this 
so-called exception makes particularly visible the other side of the same coin: Watsuji’s lack 
of contact with “native” people.16 Indeed, Watsuji leaves practically no substantial traces of 
companionship with German scholars. e Germans with whom he engaged were limited 
to only two people: the landlady of the house he was renting, and his language teacher. 
Particularly revealing is his avoidance of Martin Heidegger. Watsuji sent a letter from 
Florence to Tanabe Hajime on 26 March 1928, excusing himself for not having made good 
use of the letter of introduction to Martin Heidegger prepared for him by Tanabe. is was 
the date on which he decided to cut short his stay in Europe from the promised two years 
to one year and a half. In the Greek Socratic tradition, philosophieren consisted of dialogue. 
And yet, Watsuji deliberately refrained from putting this into practice while he was in the 
genuine homeland of philosophy. He excused himself by stating that solitary reading in his 
10 German terms have been retained here and below because they help evoke the fact that Watsuji himself 
took notes by inserting German terminology in Japanese syntax. On Watsuji’s opinion of the possibility of 
practicing philosophy in and with the Japanese language, see Susa 2009, pp. 154–61. 
11 Takeda 2001, p. 141. 
12 WTZ, vol. 25, p. 248.
13 Polanyi 1967, p. 22. Menon is evoked here because Watsuji himself, as a good student of the Greek classics, 
could not have been ignorant of the passage.
14 There are many studies of Sōseki’s stay in London. Here, I use Wada et al. 2009. (See Wada et al. 2009, p. 
262.)
15 For the wording ningenmi, see Takeda 2001, p. 141.
16 Karube 2010, p. 173.
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study was far more efficient. e enormous amount of letters and picture postcards he sent 
to his wife back in Japan reveals the real content of his stay in Europe. And it was out of 
these voluminous letters home that he constructed his Fūdo.
3.  Ningengaku as a Variant of the Study of Nations
Not unexpectedly, what Watsuji discovered during his stay in Europe was not the West but 
rather the “national characteristics” (kokuminsei 国民性) of Japan. Indeed, he spent his time 
mainly conversing with fellow Japanese, while making frequent sightseeing trips through 
most of Europe. He kept his distance from native inhabitants, amongst whom he engaged in 
a kind of non-participant observation. It transpires that the outcome, Fūdo (1935), was a new 
type of study of Japanese national characteristics, presented in the guise of ningengaku 人間
学. Ningengaku is a neologism distancing Watsuji’s position from Western as well as (neo-)
Confucian human-centered ethics: it means “the study of ningen,” where ningen refers to the 
human, zooid as well as species, but its literal meaning is “inter-human,” the relation in be-
tween, preceding the establishment of individuality and personality in the sense of “persona.”
Discussions of the Japanese national character had become fashionable after Japan’s so-
called victory over Russia in 1905. Take the case of Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎 (1856–1944), 
first holder of the chair of philosophy in a Japanese imperial university after his seven 
year stay in Germany. Inoue published Kokumin dōtokuron 国民道徳論 in 1912, aimed at 
propagating the ideals of the Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyōiku chokugo 教育勅語). 
e last chapter included a “Criticism of Nationality.” As a student, Watsuji was famous for 
his rebellious attitude toward this founding father.17 Haga Yaichi 芳賀矢一 (1867–1927), 
Professor in the Department of Japanese Language and Literature at the Tokyo Imperial 
University, is also known as the author of Kokuminsei jūron 国民性十論 (1908). One may 
detect repercussions of this trend for philosophical reflection on national character spread-
ing in China, too. Among numerous publications, one may single out Dài Jitáo’s 戴季陶 
(1891–1949) Nihonron 日本論 (1927). One may put side by side Dài’s observation of the 
Japanese and Watsuji’s Fūdo as contemporary reflections that complemented each other. 
Watsuji confesses in his article “Kokuminsei no kōsatsu” 国民性の考察 (1928) published im-
mediately after his return from Europe, that he had not yet been conscious of the problem 
of “national mentality” at the moment of his departure from Japan. It was only having seen 
the countries in Asia and Europe before coming back to Japan that he “vividly felt for the 
17 Katsube 1987, pp. 101–104. Also see Ejima 2009, pp. 15–29. For the position of Kokumin dōtokuron in 
the history of Japanese thought and its relationship with Watsuji, see Shimizu 1999, pp. 162–82. Karube 
2010 (Chapter 3, n. 13) points out that three of Watsuji’s predecessors at Tokyo Imperial University and 
his predecessor in Kyoto, Fujii Kenjirō 藤井謙治郎, all wrote on something similar to a theory of national 
morality. In the supplementary materials Tōkyō Teikoku Daigaku gakujutsu taikan, Bungakubu dai 11shō, 
“Rinri gakka” 『東京帝国大学学術大観』文学部 第11章「倫理学科」written by Watsuji and Kakeko Takezō 
金子武蔵 (reproduced in Karube 2010, pp. 329–43), one can confirm that the jinkaku shugi to kokumin 
dōtokuron 人格主義と国民道徳論, as formed by Nakajima Rikizō 中島力蔵 (1858–1918), Yoshida Seichi 吉
田静致 (1872–1945), and Fukasaku Yasubumi 深作安文 (1874–1962) was transformed into “philosophical 
anthropology” (tetsugakuteki ningengaku 哲学的人間学) with Watsuji’s arrival. In other words, it was 
not merely the nation-state’s pressures that Watsuji’s ningengaku was shouldering, but also the academic 
tradition of national morality.
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first time peculiarities of Japan and the Japanese, which were extremely interesting.”18 As 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe put it, reflection on one’s own nationality germinates in one’s 
experience in foreign lands and foreign speech.19 Let us recall here that Dài’s Nihonron was 
translated into Japanese in 1934, one year earlier than Watsuji’s Fūdo. Both of them were 
bestsellers at that time.20
4.  Predecessors, Contemporaneity
In order to locate Watsuji in the genealogy of Japanese philosophers who stayed abroad in 
the West, let us briefly examine the case of one of his predecessors, Itō Kichinosuke 伊藤吉
之助 (1885–1961). Disciple of Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎, Itō went to Germany in 1920 at 
the age of thirty five, and chose young Martin Heidegger as his Repetitor or privately hired 
tutor.21 One of the key terms in Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (1926) is in-der-Welt-sein (Being-
in-the-world). According to Imamichi Tomonobu 今道友信, the idea stems from Okakura 
Kakuzō’s 岡倉覚三 expression “being in the world” as it was formulated in his e Book of 
Tea (1906; translated into Japanese as Cha no hon 茶の本), and Okakura himself developed 
the idea from the Daoist Zhuangzi 荘子 (369–296 BC), who talked about “worldly exis-
tence” (shosei 処世). Imamichi recalls how Itō was frustrated by Heidegger’s borrowing, as 
it was Itō himself who had given Heidegger a copy of the German translation of Okakura’s 
Das Buch vom Tee by Steindorf (1908) in 1919.22 One may inquire: Why should he have 
been frustrated?
Watsuji was born in the same year as Heidegger, and upon his return from Berlin, 
he began constructing his ningengaku by putting emphasis on the relationship, i.e. “in-
between-ness” (Beziehung or aidagara 間柄) that defines and composes the human persona 
and individuality that is condemned to “Being-in-the-world.” Itō Kichinosuke’s presence as 
a person-in-between, bridging Heidegger and Watsuji, partly accounts for Watsuji’s strong 
affinity as well as deliberate opposition to his “rival,” Martin Heidegger.
18 The lecture notes are from the archives of the National Diet Library (Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan 国立国会
図書館). Cited in Karube 2010, p. 172. They were revised and included in Fūdo.
19 Hamburger Ausgabe, ed. E. Trunz, vol. XII, p. 508. Note that Japanese high school students from the pre-war 
period until the end of the 1970s learned by heart Goethe’s original German “Wer fremde Sprachen nicht kennt, 
weiß nichts von seiner eigenen” (One who knows nothing of foreign languages knows nothing of one’s own).
20 Tō 2003, pp. 16–33. Furthermore, Lin Yutang’s (Rin Godō 林語堂, 1895–1976) My Country, My People 
was translated into Japanese as Waga kokudo, waga kokumin 我国土・我国民 (1938), becoming available to 
a Japanese readership three years later than Watsuji’s Fūdo. The English original version, My Country, My 
People made quite a splash in the international scene. While its anti-Japanese stance is obvious, Japanese 
intellectuals like Abe Tomoji 阿部知二 (1903–1973) and others introduced it in an attempt to convey a sense 
of concern. Watsuji’s writing must be examined in the context of contemporary literature on nationality and 
national characteristics. It must also be emphasized that Watsuji’s own ningengaku was an elaboration of, 
and a modification from, the previous scholarship in the lineage of Chinese ethics conducted at the Imperial 
University by Watsuji’s predecessors.
21 Takeda 2001, p. 20. See also Abe 1966. For an interesting reflection on Itō Kichinosuke’s seminar on Hegel, 
see Imamichi 1983, pp. 82–87. The present author’s point here is to inform the uninitiated reader of the 
relationship between Itō, Heidegger and Watsuji through a relevant anecdote on “Being-in-the-world;” and 
to show, at the same time, the psychological frustration—a sign of insular mentality—that these Asians 
manifested in their relationships with German philosophy students. Though “dubious” in its accuracy, 
Imamichi’s testimony should not be dismissed, as he was the only surviving eyewitness (Imamichi passed 
away on 13 October 2012). The present author has examined the aesthetic and philosophical implications of 
this anecdote elsewhere. (See Inaga 2007.) 
22 Imamichi 1999.
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As Watsuji’s contemporary, Kuki Shūzō 九鬼周造 (1888–1941) cannot be overlooked 
either. Son of Baron Kuki Ryūichi 九鬼隆一 (1850–1931), Shūzō went to Europe as early as 
1921 and studied with Heinrich Rickert (1863–1936) in Heidelberg. Under the hyperinfla-
tion after the war, the wealthy Baron Kuki junior did not hesitate to ask Professor Rickert to 
come to his house to lecture him personally. Unsatisfied with his mentor, Kuki then moved 
to Paris to make the acquaintance of Henri Bergson (1859–1941) and Léon Brunschwig 
(1869–1944), and took part in the philosophy seminar in Pontigny as the sole Asian partici-
pant. He had the young Normalian, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) as his répétiteur. Moving 
again to Marburg, he befriended Martin Heidegger.23 Watsuji met Kuki in Paris on 6 April 
1927, after more than ten years. We do not know how Watsuji felt before the Europeanized 
Kuki. Still, it was clear that Watsuji had to find his own way, since it was obviously already 
too late for him to catch up with his former eminent colleague, only one year senior to him.
After the war, Heidegger engaged in a conversation with “a Japanese,” i.e. Tezuka 
Tomio 手塚富雄 (1903–1983), and referred therein to the late Baron Kuki. The German 
philosopher was of the opinion that Kuki had made such an exemplary elucidation of the 
notion of iki 粋 in a European language that the door to the heart of Japanese language was 
all the more tightly closed.24 Here is a paradox of verbal communication. After “Iki” no kōzō 
「いき」の構造 (1930), Kuki published in Japanese Gūzensei no mondai 偶然性の問題 (1935), 
referring to Leibnitz’s notion of mondes possibles.25 And yet Kuki’s abstract and somehow in-
sipid phrasing cruelly demonstrates, stylistically as well as on the level of vocabulary, his dif-
ficulty in practicing philosophy in the Japanese language.26 Kuki could not help feeling ill at 
ease at the faculty meetings in Kyoto University. He is said to have asked himself from time 
to time why he had to be there, instead of in Paris. His not being in the European world 
of philosophers, his alienation from the Western Republic of Letters, and the consequent 
impossibility of access to another “possible world” may well have motivated Kuki to ponder 
the problem of contingency, reflecting his own existential destiny as an Asian.27 Watsuji was 
to become Kuki’s colleague at the Faculty of Letters in Kyoto Imperial University.
e contrast between Kuki and Watsuji is notable. While Kuki’s Gūzensei no mondai 
(1935) was the fruit of his stay in Europe for no less than seven years, Watsuji’s Fūdo, 
published in the same year, was nothing but a quickly written book, almost instantaneously 
composed from fragmentary and intuitive reflections the author made during his shorter 
stay in Europe of only a year and a half.28 One may wonder whether or not Watsuji, with 
his Fūdo, successfully responded to the danger Heidegger felt vis a vis Kuki’s Westernized 
23 Ōhashi 2009, p. 120.
24 Ōhashi 2009, pp. 137–41. The corresponding passage is in Heidegger 1985, S. 85.
25 On this notion of mondes possibles or compossibles and its recent applications, see, among others, Miura 1997.
26 Omodaka Hisayuki 澤瀉久敬 (1904–1995) made a French translation of Kuki’s book as Problème de la 
contingence, which is far more readable than the Japanese original. Furthermore, while Watsuji asserts that 
“Japanese is not an inappropriate language for philosophical thinking,” he also says that “as far as thinking is 
concerned, it is still a virginal language.” See Watsuji 1935 and Kumano 2009.
27 This observation of mine helps to explain existential reasons for Kuki choosing to talk about the “Cyclical 
Structure of Time.” Here, Kuki referred to the logical possibility of returning to Athena of the epoch of 
Socrates, thus annihilating his distance from his ideal place. See Kuki, “La notion du temps et la reprise sur le 
temps en Orient” which was to be published with another essay in Propos sur le temps, 1928 (Kuki 1980, vol. 
1). This essay may have inspired not only Jean-Paul Sartre but also Albert Camus in his Le Mythe de Sisyphe 
(1942).
28 For Kuki’s Gūzensei no mondai, see Kuki 1980, vol. 2. 
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pieces of philosophy. Before coming back to this delicate question, however, we have to cast 
a glance at one other student in aesthetics, Ōnishi Yoshinori 大西克禮 (1888–1959), who 
took the same steamer to Europe as Watsuji.
Ōnishi completed his Ph.D. on Kant after his return from Germany. As Professor at 
the Imperial University of Tokyo, he successively published studies in Japanese poetics and 
aesthetics, such as Yūgen to aware 幽玄とあはれ (1939), Fūgaron: “sabi” no kenkyū 風雅論: 
「さび」の研究 (1940) and Manyōshū no shizen kanjō 万葉集の自然感情 (1943). In his meth-
odology, Ōnishi proposed a parallel between Western and Japanese traditions. According to 
Ōnishi, the “Kunstästhetisch (Art-Aesthetic) Moment” was predominant in the West, while 
“in the East, and in particular in Japan” in contrast, the “Naturästhetisch (Nature-Aesthetic) 
Moment” prevailed “in relation with its weather and climate.”29
One may suppose that “weather and climate” echoes not only Watsuji’s approach in 
Fūdo, but also the intellectual climate of the period itself. Keeping this basic dichotomy 
between the East and the West in mind, Ōnishi stages within it the triptych elements of 
“Beauty, Sublimity and Humor” as universal categories. He then argues that the three 
categories are articulated respectively as “Gracefulness, Tragedy and Ridiculousness” in the 
West, whereas “in the East or in Japan,” he maintains, “the three elements are differentiated 
into aware, yūgen and sabi’” respectively.30 
Generally speaking, Ōnishi’s approach consists of associating Japanese notions to the 
Western and universal category. Firstly, he qualifies Japanese-ness or Oriental-ness as an 
auxiliary supplement to Western scholarship. Secondly, he emphasizes Japanese/Oriental 
characteristics as irreducible to their Western counterparts. Oriental aesthetics in general, and 
Japanese aesthetics in particular, are defined here as derivative, deviating from the Western 
standard. irdly, his emphasis on Tiefe (profundity) or Dunkelheit (darkness/obscurity) in 
the Oriental medieval tradition suggests his search for mystical elements, which would escape 
Western scholarly elucidations.31 is obscurantism partakes of Heidegger’s terminology of 
“verborgenheit” or “aletheia” (that is, truth as something hidden and forgotten). 
While searching for Oriental originality, Ōnishi did not hesitate to subordinate himself 
to the Western academic tradition, which appeared then as universally valid. And yet one 
cannot help detecting in his writing a mixture of retreat and self-aggrandizement. While he 
refrained from writing and publishing these pieces in the German language, which he was 
capable of doing, he at the same time treated Japanese poetics as representative of the whole 
Orient, beyond the confines of Japan.32
e previous generation, epitomized by Nitobe Inazō 新渡戸稲造 (1862–1933), author 
of Bushidō: the Soul of Japan (1900), or Okakura with his e Book of Tea, published their 
main books in English, but the following generation of Watsuji and Ōnishi mainly wrote 
and published in Japanese. Avoidance of communicating directly with the West and un-
conscious arrogance toward other Asian nations—in their substituting Japan for the whole 
Orient—constituted a kind of “lion at home and a mouse abroad” type duplicity, which 
crept into the mentality of Japanese intellectuals born in the second decade of the Meiji era. 
29 Ōnishi 1939, pp. 5–6.
30 Ōnishi 1943, pp. 49–51.
31 Ōnishi 1939, pp. 94 and 100.
32 The case of Tsuzumi Tsuneyoshi 鼓常良 (1887–1981) might also be introduced in this context, and compared 
with contemporary scholars in esthetics. 
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is change in mentality may be understood as a secondary side effect of the shift in 
the means of transportation. Going abroad on board a foreign steamer was replaced now by 
the use of one’s own nation’s flag-bearing passenger ship. e vogue of research into “Oriental 
aesthetics” meant not only the rediscovery of one’s own culture after a pilgrimage in foreign 
lands; Japan’s own pride and prestige also played a role here. With the enhancement of 
national dignity, going abroad was losing its significance and becoming a mere ritual, devoid 
of substantial raison d’ être. e “expiry date,” so to speak, of studying in the West seemed to 
be fast approaching by the end of 1930s.33
5.  From Sein und Zeit to Fūdo: Zeitlichkeit in a Contemporary Context
This brings us to the problem of the timeliness (if not Zeitlichkeit in Heidegger’s sense) 
of Watsuji’s trip to Europe. If one is to believe Watsuji’s preface to Fūdo, it was in the 
early summer of 1927, while he was reading Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit in Berlin, that the 
problem of climate came to his mind. “If ‘Zeitlichkeit’ is so fundamental for the structure 
of a subject-existence, why was ‘Raumlichkeit’ (sic) not as important as the former,” was the 
problem as he recalled it. And yet we must notice that the preface was not written in 1927 in 
Berlin; rather, it was dated August 1935, eight years after his return to Japan. A text written 
by Kuki Shūzō between the two dates, namely in March 1933, merits our attention. In his 
unpublished notes on “Philosophie Heideggers” (1933, included in Kuki 1982), Kuki raises 
a question. Heidegger considers Fürsorgende-Zeit (time of concern) or Welt-Zeit (world-time) 
as inauthentic, although he recognizes their Offentlichkeit (publicness/openness). Does this 
not mean that Heidegger, despite his thesis on Mit-einender-Sein (Being-with-one-another) 
inadequately develops the existential perspective inherent in the Raum (space)?34 One may 
presume that Kuki’s “existential perspective of space” may have been recast by Watsuji as 
Raumlichkeit for the preface of Fūdo. It was as antithesis to Heidegger’s Zeitlichkeit that 
Watsuji ambitiously put forward the notion of Raumlichkeit. Yet his idea of Sein und Raum 
(Being and Space) remained rhetorical and appeared only in the preface. It is difficult to 
identify any sophisticated logical or theoretical coherence between the Raumlichkeit in the 
preface and the notion of fūdo in the following chapters, which had been written earlier.
One may presume that it was during the process of his writing Fūdo that Watsuji came to 
recognize the importance of Kuki’s idea of an “existential perspective of space,” which Watsuji 
only later translated into fūdosei or “climaticity.” As we shall see, this is a problematic translation 
of Raumlichkeit. is circumstantial evidence allows us to circumscribe the making of Fūdo: 
without Watsuji’s reading of Sein und Zeit in Berlin—a mere coincidence and a work of contin-
gency in Zeitlichkeit—conjugated with his voyage to Europe by passenger ship—a determining 
factor of Raumlichkeit—he could not have conceived his Fūdo, as we know it today. 
33 Obviously this tendency toward an introverted mentality contributed to the isolation of the monde de 
philosophes in Japan from the rest of the world. Although Watsuji was not directly involved in right wing 
ultra-nationalism, he (and his generation) was largely responsible for Japanese intellectual isolation. It is an 
irony that Watsuji in the post-war period tried to compensate by his condemnation of Tokugawa isolation 
politics, epitomized in his Sakoku: Nihon no higeki 鎖国: 日本の悲劇 (1950). This observation should lead to a 
modified view of the late Watsuji as a “progressive intellectual.”
34 Kuki 1982, vol. 10, p. 174 sq. For bibliographical detail, see Karube 2009. Watsuji, Kuki’s colleague at the 
Department of Philosophy in the Imperial University of Kyoto, would not have missed the chance to talk 
about Kuki’s interpretation of Heidegger. 
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Another coincidence for the factor of Zeitlichkeit was the posthumous publication of 
Wilhelm Dilthey’s Gesammelte Schriften Bd. 7 (1927) as Der Aufbau der Geschichtlichen Welt 
in den Geisteswissenschaften. e reading of this newly published volume of Lebensphilosophie 
(life philosophy) encouraged Watsuji to orient himself toward the idea of Sein zum Leben 
(Being-toward-life) instead of the Heideggerien Sein zum Tode (Being-toward-death). Dil-
they grasped the totality of the empirical reality composed of human activities, or Erlebnis 
(experience), as an expression of ursprungliches Leben (fundamental experience).35 According 
to Frithjof Rodi, however, this thinking of the late Dilthey was not taken into account by 
Heidegger while he was preparing Sein und Zeit.36 It follows that Watsuji’s philosophical 
ambition consisted in synthesizing Heidegger and Dilthey under the notion of Raumlichkeit. 
Yet it must be asked how Der Aufbau der Geschichtlichen Welt comes together with the 
notion of “human climate,” as it was elaborated in Watsuji’s Fūdo.
A key to this question may lie in a passage Watsuji wrote in his Rinrigaku 倫理学 (1931) 
after his return from Europe, namely “the extreme limit of Heidegger’s Dasein analysis con-
sists in his thinking that only through the understanding of Sein can the Other appear.”37 
Karube Tadashi expounds the Sein in this context as “negotiations with zu-handen-Welt 
(the world at hand).” is interpretation shows, as Karube himself notices, that Watsuji ap-
proached Heidegger from his understanding of ningengaku.38 Ōhashi Ryōsuke 大橋良介 also 
judiciously points out that “Watsuji thereby failed to recognize the metaphysical dimension 
in Heidegger.”39 Obviously these two approaches make for a vicious circle. In fact, Watsuji’s 
“misunderstanding” was a necessary tactic to draw Heidegger’s (meta-physical) Dasein into 
Watsuji’s own field of inter-human ethics (ningengaku). Indeed, Ōhashi does not fail to men-
tion that Dasein for Watsuji emerged only between individual human beings, i.e. the field 
Watsuji defines as belonging to his “ningengaku.” is Inzwischenheit (or “between-human-
ness,” which for Heidegger includes Das Man) demanded to be treated in Raumlichikeit, 
which Watsuji renamed as fūdosei, an abstraction of fūdo.40 
In his initial chapter, “Fūdo no genshō” 風土の現象, Watsuji deliberately confronts 
Heidegger. Dasein, which Watsuji redefines as Sein zum Leben, is forced to ex-ist in the 
world, as Heidegger stresses. When we feel it is cold we are ex-posed into the coldness, 
says Watsuji, paraphrasing the German thinker, and supposes this exposure as the initial 
35 For a very sharply written summary of the circumstances of these publications and Watsuji’s reading of them, 
see Karube 2010, pp. 178–82. For details of Watsuji’s reading of Dilthey, see ibid, Chapter 3, n. 35 and 36. 
For Watsuji’s criticism of Heidegger, see Mine 2002. For a comparison of Heidegger’s and Watsuji’s view of 
Dasein, see Liederbach 2006, Chapter 3. Due to space limitations, I do not touch here on the similarities and 
differences of these references.
36 Rodi 1986, p. 11.
37 WTZ, vol. 9, p. 162.
38 Watsuji, “Rinrigaku,” pp. 103–104. (WTZ, vol. 9, p. 162.) Cited in Karube 2010, p. 181. Karube adds that 
“Heidegger himself would probably see this as a misreading.” (Karube 2010, p. 179). The paraphrase should 
be regarded as Watsuji’s own understanding, supplemented with Heidegger’s terminology.
39 Ōhashi 2009, pp. 154–57. Ōhashi deploys the term “metaphysical” in order to distinguish it from Watsuji’s 
inter-human ethics. Needless to say, Hito to hito to no aida 人と人との間 is the title of an influential book by 
Kimura Bin 木村敏, who refers to Watsuji. As written in the subtitle and another annotation, the notion of 
aida or “in-Zwischen-heit” is closely related to Ludwig Binzwanger’s notion of Daseinsanalytik. 
40 Let it suffice to indicate here that both Karube and Ōhashi point out the same chiasm which occurred in 
Watsuji’s (forced) interpretation of Heidegger, and give explanations from their own fields: Karube from his 
standpoint as political scientist, and Ōhashi from his standpoint as a scholar of German philosophy.
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form of aidagara or Watsuji’s translation of the German Verhältnisses.41 ough excessively 
philosophical and almost incomprehensible for the ordinary Japanese readership, this 
part was a tour de force for Watsuji in his face-to-face confrontation (which we could call 
his “Miteinandere Sitzung”) with Heidegger.42 We have to detect the extent to which the 
Heideggerian notion das Man (the they) was reformulated and modified into seken 世間 (the 
world/the public) by Watsuji.
Hence, the notion of Mitwelt (with-world) and the modus vivendi of the Mitdasein 
(which is more crucial than Mitsein for Watsuji ’s ethical thought) interested this 
Japanese philosopher. e analysis also requires “we” as the subject-predicate, as “we” 
are destined to be born into preexisting modes of relationships. Take the example of 
language. We are not capable of weaving language as an individual subject-predicate, 
but we are born and exposed in the preexisting with-world, namely language, and we 
begin to make an utterance in our exposure in this world and gradually form our own 
Dasein by weaving, as it were, our utterances in it. It is only a posteriori that we find 
ourselves there (sich finden). From this reflection on sich finden, Heidegger develops the 
idea of Befindlichkeit (attunement) in correlation with the idea of Geworfenheit (thrown-
ness), to which Watsuji refers. 
In Watsuji’s discussion, Mitwelt (with-world) must be differentiated from Umwelt. 
Usually Umwelt is the equivalent of English “environment,” and Jakob von Uexküll’s 
(1864–1944) inf luence on Heidegger is already well known.43 However, such an 
ordinary understanding of environment as opposed to human existence is, according to 
Watsuji, the common deficiency in Western thinking from which not even Heidegger 
was immune. The insufficiency of the notion of Umwelt for Watsuji consisted in the 
fact that Dasein perceives things there merely as Zeug (tool), i.e. an entity at one’s 
disposal. In other words, the Western perception of grasping the natural environment 
as something at the disposal of human beings remains in the notion of Umwelt.44 To 
this idea of Umwelt as accessible environment, Watsuji opposed the idea of Mitwelt 
and recognized it as an important contribution by Heidegger, for it was in the Mitwelt 
that one (Dasein) could encounter others, and appear as Mitdasein.45 And yet Watsuji 
41 Watsuji 1935 (1943, 1967), p. 12. 
42 Watsuji 2011, pp. 11–29. Augustin Berque regrets that Watsuji’s philosophical endeavor here has not been 
recognized. Most English and German translations of Fūdo completely overlook the distinction which 
Watsuji tried to establish between fūdo and fūdosei. In contrast, Berque translates Fūdo not as “climate” but 
as “milieu” in accordance with Watsuji’s own definition. Furthermore, Berque argues that milïeuité does not 
work as a rendition of fūdosei so he coined a new word, médiance, instead. The present author’s thoughts on 
the issue are developed in Inaga 2008–2009, pp. 189–204.
43 On Heidegger’s reference to Jakob von Uexküll, see Karube 2010.
44 Watsuji 1935 (1943, 1967), pp. 23–24. WTZ hoi, vol. 1, pp. 390–93. Obviously Watsuji’s reading of 
Heidegger on this point is unacceptable to scholars of Heidegger today. However, it should be understood 
that Watsuji here is struggling with the Heidegger at the time of Sein und Zeit, and trying to think with him. 
It would be preposterous to point out Watsuji’s lack of understanding in the late Heidegger’s reflection on 
physis, for example, which lies beyond the perspective of Watsuji at the period of 1927–28, which the present 
paper is treating. It is not the intention of the author to take the late Heidegger into account here. I quote 
from the original Japanese as it is a crucial point: shizen o Zeug to shite kangaeru to iu Yōroppajin no tokusei ga 
ichijirushiku arawarete iru mono to omowareru 自然をZeugとして考へるといふヨーロッパ人の特性が著しく現
はれてゐるものと思はれる (The characteristic feature of Europeans in regarding nature as a tool is strikingly 
apparent here) (WTZ hoi, vol. 1, p. 390). Watsuji evidently here reduces Heidegger’s analysis of Zuhandenheit 
into a general tendency of European thinking.
45 Heidegger 1927, pp. 120–21, 137.
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was not fully satisfied with Heidegger’s analysis of the Mitsein. According to Watsuji, 
the encounter with the Other is mediated in Heidegger by things perceived as Zeug; 
and therefore the Mitwelt is inevitably subordinated to the Umwelt.46 So as to fully 
develop the analysis of the structure of Being-in-the-World, one should turn one’s 
attention away from the ontological character of the Sein zum Tode in Zeitlichkeit, as 
Heidegger proposes, and rather look into the living expressions of Sein zum Leben in 
Raumlichkeit. For this purpose, Watsuji deduces an abstract meta-notion of fūdosei. 
Fūdosei or fūdo-heit designates each fūdo as a particular type of In-zwischen-Raum or 
a Space-in-between, where the interactions (including inter-human transactions) take 
place between what is regarded as “Nature” and “Human Culture” in their mutual 
relationships. Dasein, in the final analysis, cannot be the causal agent, and is nothing 
but the resulting product in these mutual relationships.47 
6.  From Fūdosei to “National Ethics” 
Watsuji’s attention to fūdosei ( fūdo being the combination of natural climate and ethnic 
characteristics) is closely connected to his zeitliche Erlebnis or (un)timely experience 
which he had by accident (contingency, gūzensei 偶然性) in Shanghai on his way to 
Europe. Watsuji was an unexpected eyewitness of the general labor strike when his ship 
Hakusan maru called at Shanghai between 21–22 February 1927. e vivid impression of 
this incident is reflected in his essay “Shinajin no tokusei” 支那人の特性 (first published 
in Shisō 思想, July 1929) which would be integrated into the first section of Chapter 
3, “Shina” 支那. (The description here includes several expressions which are now 
considered politically incorrect.)48 When their ship approached Shanghai, Chang 
Kaishek’s 蒋介石 army was advancing north to the city. e workers in the Shanghai 
Labor Union organized a general strike in opposition both to the militia government 
and the Guomintang 国民党. e incident delayed the ship’s navigation schedule by one 
day. History tells us that the confrontation was to be followed shortly by Chang’s Coup 
d’État of 12 April 1927, marking the beginning of the massive repression of the Com-
munist Party.
It was under this extreme urgency, with the imminent threat of the army’s intrusion 
into and sacking of the city, that Watsuji witnessed Chinese behavior which astonished 
him. e residents in foreign concessions were desperately searching for security. ey 
asked their governments to provide protection. In contrast, the Chinese populace, who 
were constantly living “a life of anarchism, without government,” naturally “did not 
expect any protection whatsoever by the state power.” “Although they had no place to 
46 I follow here the interpretation proposed by Karube 2010, pp. 178–82.
47 Watsuji’s confrontation with Heidegger’s German text leaves its vivid traces in the notes on “Kokuminsei 
no kōsatsu” (WTZ hoi, vol. 2, pp. 380–92). For a more detailed analysis of this section from a geographic 
philosophical point of view, see Kioka 2001, Chapter 1. Fūdosei designates each fūdo as a particular type of 
In-zwischen-Raum or a Space-in-between, which Augustin Berque proposes to rename médiance (see above 
n. 42). Here the interactions take place between what has been supposed to be Nature and Human Culture 
in their mutual relationships (Miteinandere Verhältnisses), constituting écoumène in Augustin Berque’s 
terminology. (See Berque 2011.) But while Augustin Berque’s effort of precisely designating “ fūdo” in 
differentiation from “ fūdosei” is sound, the present author does not think that the differentiation in question 
is consistently maintained throughout the book, Fūdo/Climat. See our argument, infra. 
48 WTZ, vol. 8, pp. 244–56.
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escape to, they walked around nonchalantly and continued selling merchandise as usual, 
without showing any anxiety.”49
At this sight, Watsuji must have summoned up memories of the experience of the 
Kantō Great Earthquake in 1923, four years earlier. e inhabitants of Tokyo maintained 
their confidence in state power even in the face of this cataclysm, and manifested their 
spirit of mutual aid, whereas what he saw in Shanghai was a totally antipodal situation, a 
total lack of governability.50 “People were busy doing their own business without paying any 
attention to the fate of their neighbors, and once the danger became imminent, they rushed 
to flight, each in pursuit of his own interest.” Such was the Chinese national character (or 
more precisely lack of national consciousness) as observed by Watsuji, who concluded: “If 
the Japanese lose solidarity as a nation and face the Chinese individually, the Japanese can 
hardly be capable of confronting the Chinese opponent.”51 
It is in contrast with this Chinese mentality that Watsuji developed his discussion on 
“Japanese Spirit” (Nihon seishin 日本精神, 1934). Worth noting here is that he superimposes 
the contrast between the Chinese and the Japanese upon the contrast between Jews and 
Greeks. Shortly before the passage just cited, Watsuji made the audacious remark that 
“the Chinese are more Jewish than the Jews and the Japanese are more Greek than Greek 
people.”52 The former are migrating groups who make commercial transactions without 
showing any confidence in the bonds of the nation. The latter represent an idea of the 
nation-state presiding over diverse local communities by way of common ancestor worship. 
Behind Watsuji’s rash identification of the Jews with the Chinese lurks his vague uneasiness 
with multinational profit-making activities freely crossing over national boundaries.53 In 
contrast, one can anticipate in Watsuji’s Japan-Greek equation, his preference for the nation 
state as a self-conscious ethical entity (die Selbstbewußte sittliche Substanz), an idea directly 
quoted from Hegel, faithful to his German original phrasing, and one which Watsuji had 
just developed in his paper “Kokumin dōtokuron” 国民道徳論 (1932).54
e double image of the Chinese as Jews is a curious amalgam resulting from Watsuji’s 
experience in Shanghai and the stereotype of the Jews in Europe as a people lacking in a 
49 WTZ, vol. 7, p. 244. Also see Watsuji 1935 (1943, 1967), pp. 150–60; WTZ, vol. 8. Ironically enough, 
Watsuji was not able to walk freely around to see Chinese society while he was in Shanghai. (See Katsube 
1979, p. 47.) Watsuji reluctantly confessed that he could not closely observe Chinese society while he was in 
Shanghai for any more than two days. His extremely limited observation was still enough for him to develop 
a typology contrasting the two nations.
50 WTZ, vol. 23, pp. 44–45.
51 WTZ, vol. 8, p. 255. Karube 2010, pp. 193–95. Also, see Sakabe 1986, pp. 124–26, 226–32. While Sakabe’s 
work has an originality that surpasses other similar works, he avoids discussing this part of Watsuji’s Fūdo, 
thus betraying the conditions of his time and affecting Watsuji’s argumentation.
52 WTZ, vol. 8, p. 255.
53 It must be noted, however, that in the second volume of Ethics, Watsuji has a rather positive view of 
inter-tribal trade. He just thinks that the way in which commerce is conducted in the colonial period is 
problematic.
54 “Kokumin dōtokuron kōsō memo” 国民道徳論構想メモ and “Kokumin dōtokuron sōkō (shō)” 国民道徳
論草稿(抄) (circa 1927–1928) can be found in WTZ hoi, vol. 1. For the most direct criticism of this sort of 
argumentation in Watsuji, see Sakai 1997, pp. 72–116. One might suppose that his idea concerning economic 
transactions among tribes that was developed in the second volume of his Rinrigaku (1942, revised ed. 1946) 
in reference to Malinowski was initially germinated from this personal experience in Shanghai (WTZ, vol. 
10, pp. 497–99). Sakai’s work is usually evaluated poorly by Japanese researchers on Watsuji, as it articulates 
a typical North American posture toward Japanese studies. However, we ought to pay attention to the 
reception given this paper in North America and in English speaking scholarly communities. 
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notion of state, wandering across frontiers for the sake of mercantile profit making. Watsuji 
was later to substantiate the analogy between Japanese and Greek societies by a reference to 
Fustel de Coulange’s (1830–1889) La Cité antique (1901). Lafcadio Hearn (1850–1904) had 
been amazed by the similarity between the two nations, as demonstrated by de Coulange. 
Hermann von Keyserling (1880–1946) in his Das Reisetagebuch eines Philosophen (1919) 
followed Hearn in describing Japan as a mirror of ancient Greece as in La Cité antique.
In his Porisu teki ningen no rinrigaku ポリス的人間の倫理学 in 1948, three years after 
Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, Watsuji quotes de Coulange from a Japanese trans-
lation by Tanabe Teinosuke 田邊貞之助 (1944).55 Greek polises in antiquity were united 
under their common worship of the Goddess Athena. This image of a mother-goddess 
overlapped in Watsuji’s view with that of ancient Japan. For Watsuji, a unified kingdom had 
been established in ancient Japan by integrating local ancestral worship under belief in the 
Sun Goddess Amaterasu (Amaterasu Ōmikami 天照大神). Watsuji in the postwar period 
made his position clear in a controversy in 1947–48.56 He appeared as a defender of the 
emperor system and actively involved himself with its redefinition as the “symbol” (shōchō 
象徴) of the nation state under the new constitution promulgated in 1949.
7.  Watsuji and the Next Generation 
In order to clarify Watsuji’s political position, it will be profitable to take up two other 
Japanese philosophers, younger than Watsuji: Miki Kiyoshi 三木清 (1897–1945) and Yura 
Tetsuji 由良哲次 (1897–1979). One of the most prominent figures of the so-called Kyoto 
School under Nishida Kitarō’s charismatic influence, Miki Kiyoshi went to Germany in 
1923. Discouraged by the lectures of Rickert in Hiedelberg (as Miki had read Rickert in 
Japan before his departure), he moved to Marburg to study with Martin Heidegger to 
whom Rickert recommended him, calling his former German student “a very talented 
fellow.” There he also befriended Karl Löwith (1897–1973). Returning to Japan in 1927, 
Miki published Pasukaru ni okeru ningen no kenkyū パスカルにおける人間の研究 (1928), and 
began his extensive activities as a highly reputed journalist, while intensifying his Marxist 
tendencies. Watsuji moved to Kyoto around that time, as if to avoid any unnecessary 
concurrence with this younger and brilliantly talented philosophical writer.57 
Close friend of Miki, Yura Tetsuji had to wait until 1928 for family reasons before 
going abroad. Yura took the trans-Siberian railway to study in Hamburg with Ernst Cassirer 
(1874–1945), and returned home in 1931. During his stay in Germany he translated into 
German Nishida’s Eichi teki sekai 叡智的世界, but Nishida did not permit its publication 
for fear of criticism.58 e dissertation Yura completed in Germany was supposedly entitled 
Geisteswissenschaft und das Gesetz der Wille (Seishin kagaku to ishi no hōsoku 精神科学と意志
の法則; we restore here the German original title from the Japanese one Yura gave). In the 
supplementary thesis, he compared ālaya-vijñāna consciousness in Mahayana Buddhism 
55 WTZ, vol. 7, p. 172.
56 For this controversy, see Karube 2010, pp. 254–58.
57 I omit here reference to the criticisms of Watsuji’s Fūdo by Miki Kiyoshi and Tosaka Jun 戸坂潤 since they 
have often been the subject of discussion.
58 Yomota 2007 (2009), p. 133. Furthermore, in 1938, Eichiteki sekai was translated into German by Robert 
Schinzinger and others. Zettai mujun teki jiko dōitsu 絶対矛盾的自己同一 was rendered through the German 
translation of Nicholas of Cusa as “die Einheit der Gengensätze.” See Schinzinger 1971, p. 236.
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with the Kantian framework of Bewußtsein (consciousness). This subject reminds us of 
Watsuji’s own Ph.D., just published in 1927.
As is well known, the Ph.D. dissertation Watsuji presented at the Imperial University 
of Tokyo was entitled Genshi Bukkyō no jissen tetsugaku 原始仏教の実践哲学 (1927). It 
attempted to understand the notion of the dharma nature in the Chūkan 中観 (Madhyamika) 
and Yuishiki 唯識 (Consciousness-only) schools of Buddhism in conjunction with the 
Husserlian phenomenological notion of kategoriale Anschauung (honshitsu chokkan 本質
直観) or Reduktion (kangen 還元). However, his dissertation was harshly criticized by the 
distinguished Buddhologist, Kimura Taiken 木村泰賢 (1881–1930), as an insincere and 
superficially fashionable shortcut. Another scholar Sakakibara Saburō 榊原三郎 of the 
Imperial University of Kyoto went so far as to refuse Watsuji the Ph.D. degree. It was on his 
way to Europe that Watsuji prepared his response to Professor Kimura’s refutation in the 
South China Sea; he sent it from Hong Kong.59
This controversy shows that attempts at synthesizing Buddhism and Western phi-
losophy in terms of Erkentnisstheorie (theory of perception) were the order of the day. And 
Yura apparently followed a similar path to Watsuji’s after an interval of two years. Tsuchida 
Kyōson 土田杏村 (1891–1934), a prolific literary critic, had also tried to elucidate Hua-yuan 
(Kegon 華厳) thought through phenomenology. He may be regarded as their predecessor. 
Yura Tetsuji merits our attention because of his political positioning. Among the jury 
members of Yura’s Doktorarbeit (i.e. Ph.D. dissertation) was Erwin Panofsky (1892–1968).60 
Both Cassirer and Panofsky had to f lee to the United States because of their Jewish 
background. After his return from Germany, Yura published his Rekishi tetsugaku kenkyū 
歴史哲学研究 (1937) based on the Japanese translation of his own Ph.D., and dedicated it 
to his friend Miki Kiyoshi. However, Yura gradually made clear his pro-Nazi stance. It is 
well known that Yokomitsu Riichi 横光利一 (1898–1947), who went to Europe in 1936, 
chose Yura Tetsuji as his model for Yashiro, the ultranationalist protagonist in his final and 
unfinished long novel, Ryoshū 旅愁 (1948). In his book Minzoku kokka to sekaikan 民族国家
と世界観 (1943) published in Japanese during the Second World War, Yura Tetsuji warned 
of the scarcity of reflections on Volk and Geschichte in the writings of Jewish philosophers. 
This of course ref lects a general tendency in this period of National Socialism. And yet 
the similarity between Yura’s stance and Watsuji’s view of the Jewish people cannot be 
overlooked.61
How should we differentiate Watsuji’s approach from that of Yura? e crucial figure 
in this question is Yamada Yoshio 山田孝雄 (1875–1958), linguist and the last representative 
of the tradition of “national studies” (kokugaku 国学). Yura, on the one hand, came progres-
sively closer to Yamada in his studies of the ancient Japanese language and mythology, 
partaking in the fanatic tendency of “imperial philosophy.” In contrast, Watsuji began to 
manifest his fundamental disagreement with Yamada. In his Son’nō shisō to sono dentō 尊皇
59 Karube 2010, pp. 166–70. Also see Chapter 3, note 15. For Watsuji’s refutation, see “Kimura Taiken shi no 
hihyō ni kotau”  (WTZ, vol. 5, pp. 569–80).
60 The hotbed for the thought of Cassirer and Panofsky, who supervised Yura Tetsuji’s doctoral dissertation, was 
Abi Warburg, founder of a private library built in Hamburg. Ludwig Binswanger treated Abi Warburg for his 
mental disorder. Binswanger is known to have developed his idea of Daseisanalyse under the strong influence 
of Heidegger.
61 Indeed, Watsuji, in the third volume of his Rinrigaku (1949), takes pains to refute the idea that the Jewish 
people were the first to obtain historical awareness.
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思想とその伝統, also published in 1943, Watsuji makes his position clear. While Yamada 
saw in Hirata Atsutane 平田篤胤 (1776–1843) the genuine successor of Moto’ori Norinaga 
本居宣長 (1730–1801), Watsuji objected to this genealogy.62 
The controversy dealt with two opposing views of Japanese mythical cosmology. 
Hirata preached the “Way of Ghosts” (yūmei no michi 幽冥の道) or the quest of the souls 
after death, by designating Ame-no-minaka-nushi-no-mikoto 天御中主神 as the presiding 
divinity. However, Norinaga, according to Watsuji, preached a diametrically opposite view 
of “the Way of Kami” as “the way of daylight” (mahiru no michi 真昼の道), “brightly lit 
and healthy” (meirō kattatsu 明朗闊達). One may presume that Watsuji rejected Yamada’s 
idea of obscurity by opposing to it an Apollonian image of a Sun Goddess divinity, thereby 
escaping from the prevailing Dionysian tendency of Shinto fanaticism.63
ough Watsuji is not explicit on the following point, there is more to this opposition. 
Muraoka Tsunetsugu 村岡典嗣 (1884–1946) demonstrated as early as 1920 that Hirata 
had studied Catholicism through the writings of Matteo Ricci 利瑪竇 (1552–1610) so 
as to consolidate his monotheistic cosmogony of Shintoism.64 By making tactical use of 
Christian theology as ideological weaponry, Hirata establishes an extremely self-righteous 
and egocentric notion of Shinto divinity. Here is a curious paradox: Hirata, while showing 
much receptivity and a tendency to syncretism in his theoretical apparatus, presents his 
end product as a self-fulfilling and auto-genetic system that excludes any possible foreign 
imports. In contrast, Watsuji’s basic idea of Japanese culture consolidated around this period 
was quite the opposite. Watsuji saw Japanese culture in its functionality of maintaining, in 
terms of spatial coexistence, historically stratified diverse elements that had been assimilated 
through foreign importation from one period to the next. Judging from such a historical 
conception of Japanese culture as a stratified accumulation of foreign elements, it was logical 
that Watsuji saw distortions in Hirata’s mono-linear, isolationist, and self-assertive vision of 
Shinto cosmology. 
Ironically, Hirata’s vision of Shinto proves excessively monotheistic. In contrast, 
Watsuji’s own view of Shinto was eclectic or syncretistic, if not pantheistic. Paradoxically, 
Yamada Yoshio’s fanatic “imperial philosophy,” based on his interpretation of Hirata, 
partakes of Judeo-Christianity, despite, or precisely because of, Yamada’s opposition to 
Judeo-Christianity. At the same time, Watsuji’s understanding of Shinto as national worship 
was modeled after an idealized Greek antiquity. The Chinese general strike that Watsuji 
had witnessed in Shanghai undeniably worked as a catalyst here. It cast a lingering shadow 
of negative obsession upon his positive perception of Shinto. Indeed, it was as if to oppose 
Japan to China that Watsuji defined Shinto as a manifestation of the “Wirklichkeit” (reality) 
of the Japanese. Hence the claim of a “Selbstbewußte sittliche Substanz,” or a self-conscious 
ethical substance, a key term given in the German original in Watsuji’s notes on ethics, 
particular to the fūdosei of the Japanese archipelago.65
62 Karube 2010, pp. 227–31.
63 WTZ, vol. 18, pp. 228–31, 289–90. 
64 WTZ, vol. 13, pp. 33–39. Here I refer to Karube 2010, pp. 228–31. It has been known since Muraoka 
Tsunetsugu’s study that Atsutane made use of the work of Matteo Ricci for his notion of Shinto gods. 
Furthermore, Watsuji developed his discussion of both spiritual bond ( jintai 靭帯) which forms the state, and 
the problem of national character, in confrontation with Marxism. 
65 Karube 2010, pp. 203, 234.
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8.  Yearning or Nostalgia: Watsuji and His Antiquity
How, then, did this overlapping of idealized Greece upon ancient Japan take form? And how 
might this imaginary Greco-Japanese likening be related with Watsuji’s travel to the West? 
Interestingly enough, Watsuji did not go sightseeing in Greece. It seems as if he avoided 
field observation so as to keep intact his idyllic image of ancient and classical Greece. In 
Fūdo, Watsuji relies entirely upon the travel reports of his friend, Abe Yoshishige 安部能
成 (1883–1961) as well as bookish statistics on climate in order to consider the fūdo of the 
ancient Aegean Sea. Watsuji selects his topics mainly from the deeds of antiquity, and shows 
practically no interest in medieval or modern Greece. Watsuji also grasped the contrast 
between Mediterranean Greek clarity and West European “shadow and melancholy” as local 
complements in Europe.66
It is well known that Watsuji based the Fūdo chapter “Makiba” (or “Bokujō”) 牧場—
“meadow” in English—on a letter to his wife, Teruko 照子. The description starts from 
his impression of the spring in Sicily, which he saw from the steamer after passing through 
the Aegean Sea. In other words, Watsuji’s remarks on Greece were not based on Greece at 
all. As for the difference between the small polises in ancient Greece and the vast Roman 
Empire, Watsuji relied once again upon the hypothesis presented by Kamei Takayoshi 亀井
高孝 (1886–1977), as it was delivered to Watsuji “after Kamei’s trip to Greece.” According 
to Kamei, the limit of water supply in ancient Greece was overcome by the Roman construc-
tion of the “Aqua Appia” (aqueducts of the Appian Way), demonstrating the triumph of 
human technology over Nature. And yet Watsuji adds, “‘Civitas Romana’ practically had 
nothing to do with the city-state in the Italian Renaissance.”67
Watsuji’s ref lection on “Makiba,” summarized here, was to be integrated into the 
third part of the third chapter of Fūdo, where Watsuji performed a double operation. While 
paying special attention to the “Light of Reason in the meadow climate,” Watsuji contrasts 
it with “Emotional Refinement in the Monsoon Climate.”68 ough the two types formed 
a contrast, it should not be overlooked that Watsuji conceived the two as supplementing 
each other. We have already observed a similar pattern of typology operating in Ōnishi 
Katsunori’s binary aesthetic scheme contrasting the West and the East. 
However, the juxtaposition of the East by the West did not interest our philosopher. 
Watsuji instead talks here about the ideal combination of the two as a synthesis. In another 
article “Kokumin dōtoku ron” (composed in 1931 and published in 1932) written almost 
in parallel with Fūdo, he manifested his hope of realizing in Japan the Hegelian idea of 
die selbstbewußte sittliche Substanz (self-conscious ethical substance), as we have already 
mentioned.69 Surprisingly enough, the realization of his hope meant for him “a great restora-
tion and development of the Greek national morality” on Japanese soil.70 The following 
question naturally comes to mind: how was it possible for Watsuji to consider Japan to be 
the legitimate successor of Greek antiquity?
66 WTZ, vol. 8, pp. 118–19.
67 Watsuji 1935 (1943, 1967), p. 143. WTZ, vol. 8, p. 112.
68 WTZ, vol. 8, pp. 118–19.
69 WTZ, vol. 23, p. 101.
70 WTZ, vol. 23, pp. 166–67. “Kokumin dōtoku ron” can be found in Iwanami kōza kyōiku kagaku 岩波講座
教育科学, vol. 7. Part 1 is partly repeated in Fūdo, Chapter 3, Section 2 “Taifū teki seikaku“ 台風的性格 in 
Japan. See WTZ, vol. 23.
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In his Hōryūji e no seishinshi 法隆寺への精神史 (1994), Inoue Shōichi 井上章一, the 
eminent scholar of the history of architecture, questions Watsuji’s perceptions in Koji junrei 
on Yamato.71 Looking at the columns of the Hōryūji temple, Watsuji perceived through 
its entasis the vision of pagan temples of ancient Greece. The philosopher also found in 
the mysterious smile of the Kudara Kan’non 百済観音 (Avalokiteśvara) a similarity with 
the “archaic smile” (kosetsu no emi 古拙の笑み) of the Greek kuroi. According to Professor 
Inoue, these discourses were already outdated from the standard of contemporary art 
historical research, and such a theory of migration of Hellenism to Japan had already been 
rejected as baseless in academic discussions. Inoue sees here a contradiction. While Watsuji 
has been regarded as a fashionable writer, in reality, he was old-fashioned. At the same time, 
Inoue observes a discontinuity in Watsuji. While in his Koji junrei our philosopher had 
emphasized continuity between Greece and Japan, the same Watsuji in Fūdo stressed the 
contrast between Greek “meadow” and Japanese “monsoon.” According to Inoue, the shift 
or lack of integrity in Watsuji corresponds to more general shifts in scholarship.72
Interesting as they are, Inoue’s interpretations contain in themselves another contradic-
tion. While he refutes, on the one hand, the current stereotype of Watsuji as a writer going 
with the current, on the other hand, he explains Watsuji’s writing as a reflection of the con-
temporary Zeitgeist (spirit of the times). Was Watsuji keeping up with the times or was he 
not? Was he unzeitgemäß or zeitgemäß?73 In addition, I wonder if Inoue’s interpretation that 
Watsuji in Fūdo denied parallels between Greece and Japan is not misleading, reflecting the 
fixed idea or prejudice of Inoue himself. Instead, it may be safely stated from the outset that 
Watsuji’s utterances in Koji junrei can hardly meet the academic expectation of scientific 
rigor or originality, and that his writings cannot be properly located in the isometrics of the 
scholarly frontline in academic standards. e popular philosophy writer did not necessarily 
represent the latest scholarship of the day.
Behind Watsuji’s “baseless” judgments, it is easy to detect his personal experiences 
and fortuitous encounters in Raumlichkeit, which the chronological contingencies allowed 
him in his lifetime. Watsuji’s emotional attachment to the temple in Ikaruga 斑鳩 may be 
accounted for by his familiarity with another temple styled Ikarugaji 斑鳩寺, located in the 
west of Himeji 姫路, not far from where the Watsuji family originated. And one may also 
recall Watsuji evoking, in his autobiography, his memory of playing at the Taishidō 太子
堂 hall, named after Prince Shōtoku 聖徳太子 (574–622), in the precinct of the Kakurinji 
鶴林寺 in Kakogawa 加古川, where he spent his childhood. In Watsuji’s case, the yearning 
for (Greek) antiquity fuses with his nostalgic return to his childhood, as if it were a work 
of anamnesis.74
71 “Geistesgeschichte” or “seishinshi” 精神史 has a special connotation for the contemporary Japanese 
intellectual, that is hardly reducible to the English “intellectual history.” “History of the spirit” sounds 
strange, so we keep the original German term.
72 Inoue 1994, pp. 186–87, 221–22.
73 This is of course an ironic allusion to Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen by Friedrich Nietzsche. Either Watsuji was a 
“timely” observer or not, and the hypothesis developed by Inoue inevitably falls into a paradox on this point.
74 Watsuji 1961, pp. 60, 211.
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9.  Ajanta and Ikaruga
With this in mind, let us now return to the beginning of Koji junrei. Was Watsuji really 
lacking in coherence? e book begins with the description of the day when young students 
gathered at the Sankei’en 三渓園 villa in Yokohama to appreciate copies of the mural paint-
ings of Ajanta. e copies had just been brought to Japan from India in 1918 by Arai Kanpō 
荒井寛方 (1878–1945) and other members of the Japanese expedition. Arai had been invited 
to India by Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), the Indian poet and Asia’s first Nobel Laure-
ate, on his visit to Japan 1916. Tagore had come at the invitation of Hara Tomitarō 原富太
郎 (1868–1939), the silk tycoon, who had opened his villa and garden to the public. It was 
there that Tagore stayed. Watsuji’s wife, Teru(ko) was a close friend of Haruko 春子, Hara’s 
eldest daughter. is personal tie allowed Watsuji to frequent the villa so as to appreciate the 
distinguished pieces of art in Hara’s collection. 
In May 1918, Watsuji spent a day in the villa together with Mr. T. (Tanaka Ichimatsu 
田中一松, 1895–1983) and Mr. F. (Fukui Rikichirō 福井利吉郎, 1886–1972) closely looking 
at the Ajanta copies. at very evening, Watsuji took the train to Kyoto with them. e 
next morning, on 6 May 1918, Watsuji proceeded to Nara with Mr. and Mrs. Z. (identi-
fied as Zen’ichirō, 1892–1937, Hara Tomitarō’s son and his wife), and visited the Golden 
Pavilion of the Hōryūji temple, among other sites. One of his main purposes was to make a 
comparison between the Ajanta mural and fresco mural paintings with those fresco murals 
of the Hōryūji temple.75 
Watsuji’s description on this occasion reveals his preconceptions. “In terms of weather, 
climate and human mentality, the huge Indian subcontinent is totally different from the 
Greek peninsula in the Mediterranean Sea, but Japan is much closer to Greece.” “Hence 
the voluptuous Indian painting is transformed into a transparent beauty when it is filtered 
through the Japanese climate,” which he qualifies as “soft and serene with moisture (shime-
yaka).” “And we find here (in Japan) a remote brother of the Greek’s aesthetic consciousness.” 
is observation, serving as a sort of basso continuo, was to be confirmed in Fūdo seventeen 
years later. 76
Contrary to what Inoue claims, one should therefore recognize here a tenacious conti-
nuity in Watsuji’s opinion concerning the similarity between Japan and Greece. One should 
also add that the adjectival phrase “soft and serene with moisture” would remain Watsuji’s 
favorite qualification of the Japanese national character in his paper “Kokumin dōtoku 
ron.” It is in this paper that Watsuji likens Japanese national character to that of the ancient 
Greeks in terms of democratic community.77
75 Watsuji 1979, pp. 5, 15, 235–47.
76 Watsuji 1919, p. 317. See also Inoue 1994, p. 221. In referring to this passage, Inoue claims that Watsuji’s view of 
Koji junrei, where Greece was seen as similar to Japan, is incompatible with ideas Watsuji later developed in his 
Fūdo, where Greece is contrasted with Japan. In so doing, Inoue exaggerates discontinuity in Watsuji’s thought.
77 Cf. see also WTZ, vol. 21, p. 324.
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10.  Intuition in the Observation of Details
Finally, it is necessary to examine the peculiarity in Watsuji’s methodological approach in 
Fūdo, both in terms of its Raumlichikeit and Zeitlichkeit. Watsuji’s pilgrimage to Yamato in 
1918 (Koji junrei, 1919) was to be complemented ten years later by his Itaria koji junrei イタ
リア古寺巡礼 during his stay in Europe (1928; published as a book in 1950). Watsuji visited 
Italy for three months shortly before returning to Japan. On 26 March 1928, he sent to his 
wife several picture postcards he had purchased at the Uffizi in Florence (Figure 3).78 e im-
age he mentioned there was from La Primavera by Sandro Botticelli (Figure 4). Curiously, the 
postcard did not show the entire painting but gave only enlarged details of the flowers in the 
meadow at the footsteps of the pagan goddesses. Why was Watsuji interested in these details, 
which a careless spectator would have easily overlooked? After observing that the drawings 
of the flowers showed similar tastes as the decorative paintings by the Rinpa 琳派 school in 
Japan (the comparison itself had been proposed by Yashiro), Watsuji added in the message to 
his wife: “I think that the picture cards must have been made as Yashiro proposed.”79
Yashiro Yukio 矢代幸雄 (1890–1975) was a young graduate student of the English 
Department of the Imperial University of Tokyo, and he served as interpreter when 
Rabindranath Tagore came to Japan for the first time in 1916. Staying in Europe from 1921 
to 1925, Yashiro had become an eminent art historian due to the successful publication of 
78 The letters Watsuji sent to his wife from Europe are included in WTZ, vol. 25, pp. 168–501.
79 Watsuji 1977, p. 210. His comparisons between Boticelli and Rinpa 琳派 are also drawn from Yashiro Yukio. 
This passage reappears in revised form in Watsuji 1950 (1991), pp. 212–19. The fact is that the “well-mannered 
umbrella-shaped pine trees” appear at the end of the discussion on Florence (Watsuji 1977).
Figure 3. Watsuji’s portrait, taken in front 
of the Ufizzi Gallery, Florence, 1928.
Figure 4. Sandro Boticelli, Primavella, detail 
from a picture postcard.
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his Sandro Botticelli in three volumes from the prestigious Medici Society. Yashiro made 
his reputation by his extensive use of enlarged photographic detail in connoisseurship: his 
method allowed him to propose new attributions by identifying a hitherto overlooked Bot-
ticelli altarpiece. Similar pieces of photography with enlarged detail (such as those inserted 
in Yashiro’s monumental book on Botticelli) seem to have been already on sale as picture 
postcards by the time Watsuji visited Florence in 1928.80 
Yashiro’s method was the outcome of a recent paradigm shift in scholarship. Giovanni 
Morelli (1816–1891) had proposed a new methodology by insisting that a typically personal 
touch of the master can be detected in their unconscious rendering of details. In the quite 
separate field of criminology, techniques of identifying criminals by examining the form of 
their earlobes in photos had also developed. According to Carlo Ginsburg, such microscopic 
attention to detail was a common trait even in psychoanalysis, which claimed to detect 
mental disorders through tiny symptoms.81 To suggest this new tendency in scholarship, it 
will be adequate to mention Abi Warburg (1866–1929). Ernst Cassirer and Erwin Panofsky 
benefited enormously from the Kulturwissenschaftlich Bibliothek (the Library of Cultural 
Science) that Warburg had privately founded in Hamburg. e former—who taught Yura 
Kimiyoshi and later examined his Ph.D.—published the monumental Philosophie der 
symbolischen Formen (1923–29), later translated into English as Philosophy of Symbolic Forms 
(1953–57); the latter would go on to establish iconology beyond the limits of iconography. 
As a leading scholar in Italian Renaissance art in search of cultural symptoms hidden in 
insignificant-looking details, Abi Warburg was competing with Bernard Berenson, Yashiro’s 
mentor in Florence. Their scholarly concurrence partly hints at the contemporary intel-
lectual milieu in Europe and accounts for the background of Yashiro’s research method.
Warburg’s favorite dictum was Der liebe Gott bleibt im Detail or “Dear God resides 
in the detail.” His personal conviction resided in the intuition of deducing the whole from 
seemingly meaningless details. Watsuji did not seem to be directly aware of such a meth-
odological turn in Kulturwissenschaften (the equivalent of this term is lacking in English 
speaking countries). And Warburg’s “Dionysian” inclination must be located in opposition 
to Watsuji’s yearning for “Apollonian” clarity.82 It is nonetheless true that both of them 
made full use of picture postcards to establish their “Mnemosyne diagram.” 
To say the least, Watsuji’s own method subscribed to Yashiro’s approach, in that both 
of them tried to develop audacious hypotheses from tiny, inconspicuous but relevant details. 
Ide Takashi 出隆 (1891–1980), a specialist on Aristotle, and a close friend of Watsuji who 
often spent time with him during their stay in Berlin, recalls “with certain envy” Watsuji’s 
80 Inaga 2013.
81 Carlo Ginzburg advocated the idea of seeing signs and symptoms in minutiae within the framework of 
causation. But Warburg’s study of symptoms was guided by the mechanism of over-determination of 
interdependence, which lay beyond the limit of narrow causation. Hence it is necessary to differentiate 
between the two, as did Georges Didi-Huberman in his criticism of Ginzburg. On this debate, see Tanaka 
2010, pp. 166–70. Here, with a keen eye, Tanaka develops his argument through a comparison of Yashiro’s 
and Warburg’s understandings of Botticelli.
82 WTZ, vol. 1, pp. 202–203; WTZ, vol. 17, p. 277. The dichotomy of “Dionysian” and “Apollonian” stemming 
from F. Nietzsche, in Die Geburt der Tragödie (1872), was very popular in Japan from 1910s, and Watsuji 
himself, together with Abe Jirō, was largely responsible for its diffusion. On Nietzsche reception in Japan, see 
Sugita 2010. Watsuji’s Studies in Nietzsche (1913) is analyzed in Sugita 2010, pp. 209–248. As for Natsume 
Sōseki’s intensive reading of Zarathustra through an English translation (circa 1905–06), see Hirakawa 2012. 
Watsuji was one young student who was later to frequent Sōseki’s residence. 
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“straightforwardness in logical thinking.” Watsuji constantly demonstrated his swift ability 
to “draw a universally valid conclusion from a single fact, or rather his inclination to try and 
prove a particular conclusion from such a common and ordinary fact” (like the lack of wild 
weeds in European meadows, as we see now).83 
e choice of the meadow in Primavera is by no means unintentional. In fact, Watsuji 
in Fūdo points out that in European meadows one practically cannot find any weeds, 
whereas eliminating weeds occupies “almost eighty percent” of all the manual labor in 
agriculture in East Asia. Watsuji notes that he obtained this suggestion from the afore-
mentioned Professor Ōtsuki of the Faculty of Agriculture of Kyoto Imperial University.84 
And this observation also seems to concur with his detailed observations of the pictorial 
plane of Boticelli’s masterpiece (where we cannot discern any wild weeds). By the same 
token, Watsuji, in one of the picture postcards he sent to his wife, observed that the pine 
trees in Italy took geometrical, cone shapes, and the Italian cypress grew vertically without 
being tended by gardeners.85 
These observations allowed him to draw a general conclusion as a dichotomy: he 
singles out the contrast between the European meadows caressed by mild breezes and the 
Japanese fields and mountains exposed 
to strong and violent monsoon winds. 
is contrast not only accounts for the 
“tortured trunk of trees depicted in the 
huge screens of the Azuchi Momoyama 
安土桃山 period,” it also proves how 
artificial and how deeply dependent 
on human labor is the natural-looking 
regularity of the alignment of Japanese 
cypresses (hinoki 檜 or hiba ヒバ) in 
Japanese gardens. In contrast, Watsuji 
remarks that in a climate like that 
in Europe, “where nature does not 
manifest any ferocity, nature reveals 
itself in a rational form” (Figure 5).86
is leads Watsuji to infer, on the one hand, that Western natural science is founded in 
a discovery of Regelmäßigkeit (regularity) or rationality in Nature, which human beings are 
entitled to and summoned to conquer. Watsuji almost defines this Beruf (mission, in Max 
Weber’s terminology) as “the product of meadow climate.” On the other hand, however, 
the same remark induces Watsuji to deliver a complementary thesis that involves “grasping 
the human structure of the monsoon area as obedient and passive,” since the humidity 
in climate there manifests the ferocity of nature as rainstorms and typhoons, which lie 
83 See Ide 1973, quoted in Wada et al. 2006, p. 263.
84 Watsuji 1935 (1943, 1967), p. 76. Many Japanese travelers have noted the “absence of weeds” in Europe. 
Starting from this striking observation, Dennitza Grabakova tries to reexamine unexplored possibilities of 
Watsuji’s Fūdo. The author is indebted to Gabrakova 2012.   
85 Watsuji 1977, vol. 2, pp. 210–11.
86 Watsuji 1935 (1943, 1967), p. 91. Cf. 1977, vol. 2, pp. 104–105 (Jan. 2, 1928). Cf. pp. 108–109 (Jan. 8, 
1928), p. 121 (Jan. 15, 1928).
Figure 5. Pine tree in Appia Street, with a ruin of water 
bridge in the background. A picture postcard from the 
Former Watsuji Family Collection. 
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beyond human control.87 is contrast, despite seeming to be a naïve climatic determinism, 
also brings into relief the fundamental difference between Heidegger and Watsuji in their 
philosophical conceptions. 
Heidegger seeks to make necessary a distinction between Zuhandensein (readiness-
to-hand) and Vorhandensein (presence-at-hand) so as to elucidate the relation that Dasein 
or human being/human kind has with its environment.88 Watsuji saw nature in the West 
as an entity which may be controlled by human will and technology. In Heidegger’s Zu-
handenheit, a notion which calls to mind a disposable tool like a hammer, Watsuji detected 
the same attitude toward the natural environment still remaining in the meadow-type 
climate. In contrast, he perceived nature in the monsoon climate as something which defies 
human control. Dasein (gensonzai 現存在) here is implicitly redefined as the entity exposed 
(ex-sistere) to the uncontrollable forces of nature. At the same time, Watsuji gives priority 
to “in-between-ness” as precedent to each individual persona, and tries to found human 
Sittlichkeit (ethics, jinrin 人倫) on the state of Mitsein (kyōsonzai 共存在 or seken 世間) in 
human existence. Watsuji expounds: According to the Chinese expression, the human being 
is defined as ningen 人間, literally meaning “between-human” (to a certain degree similar 
to the Husserlian Intersubjektivität). e Chinese character for indicating the principle of 
ethics ren 仁 (usually translated as “benevolence” or “authoritative conduct”) is composed 
of “human” and “two,” suggesting the origin of Sittlichkeit as residing in, and originating 
from, the state of Mitsein between two personae. 
However, as many have already pointed out, this approach to Mitsein inevitably 
drives Watsuji to the temptation of fusing the individual into an idealized community 
or sittliche Gemeinschaft (ethical community, in contrast to a Gesellschaft established by 
a social contract), as in Ferdinand Tönnies’s classic work. Watsuji in his system of ethics 
intentionally discards individual resistance against the moral obligation of belonging to this 
imaginary community—as well as the question of alienation in Karl Marx.89 e danger of 
unconditional fusing with imperial rule in the guise of a nation-state remained subordinated 
to Watsuji’s ideological confrontation with other mainstream wartime ultranationalists. 
Such are the crucial problems in Watsuji’s ethics, which Naoki Sakai, among others, severely 
criticized from his own Marxist viewpoint.90
Here, let me limit myself to pointing out that this contrast between Zuhandensein and 
Mitsein shows the basic gap which separates Watsuji from Heidegger. While Heidegger put 
emphasis on the Zeitlichkeit of the Dasein, Watsuji finds it more important to consider the 
Raumlichkeit of the climate. is methodological bifurcation of the two thinkers tautologi-
cally corresponds to their fūdosei, to use Watsuji’s own terminology. Indeed, it also accounts 
for the fundamental “climatico-mental” ( fūdoteki 風土的) difference between Western 
87 Watsuji 1935 (1943, 1967), p. 92.
88 The notion of “Zuhandensein” evokes human existence reduced to the state of a simple tool to be replaced 
at will by others. Dasein distinguishes itself from this degraded state of human existence. This leads to the 
discussion on Eigentlichkeit (authenticity) developed by Ernst Jünger in opposition to the degradation of das 
Man as Verfallenheit, and particularly by Theodor Adorno in his Jargon der Eigentlichkeit (1964). This is of 
course an evidently unfair interpretation that Heidegger tries to avoid and forbids the readers in philosophy 
to do. Pierre Bourdieu, however, detects in this interdiction the revelation of a forbidden truth. Bourdieu’s 
reading of Heidegger understandably provoked hysteric reactions among scholars in Heidegger studies, 
precisely because it pointed out what should not be pointed out, and Bourdieu was highly aware of this 
strategy. See Bourdieu 1982, pp. 170–205.
89 Cf. WTZ, vol. 9, pp. 127, 162–64. WTZ hoi, vol. 1, pp. 378–79; vol. 2, pp. 91–105.
90 Sakai 1997, pp. 72–116; notes, pp. 201–205.
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metaphysics (a fusion of Greek, Christian and Mediterranean traditions, which privilege 
Dasein) and Eastern ningengaku (as it appears as a Japanese-style amalgam of Confucianism 
and Buddhism, built on the hidden template of Shinto ideology, which pays more attention 
to Mitsein).91 is gap is all the more crucial as Watsuji tried to overcome it—despite his 
deterministic description of the climatic conditioning of cultures—by deliberately associat-
ing Japanese sentiment with ancient Greek logic.
Conclusion
e last question we may ask in this context has to do with the intuitive attention to detail 
which brought Watsuji Tetsurō’s eye close to Yashiro Yukio’s approach to Western art 
history. The question may be formulated as follows: Was this intuition regarding detail 
a manifestation of the monsoon type of climatic-and-mental fūdosei which they shared, 
or should it be interpreted rather as a “moment” of Zeitlichkeit accidentally revealed “in 
contingency” by those two intellectuals who were to confront Western scholarship? To what 
extent were their maritime travels to the West responsible for this parallel, of which Watsuji, 
at least, was not unaware?
The year following the publication of Watsuji’s Fūdo, Takahama Kyoshi, master of 
haikai poetry, set sail to Europe by steamer together with the novelist Yokomitsu Riichi. 
On their way to Europe, passengers and crew tried to compose haikai poetry in a climate 
(tropical, arid, and meadow) where traditional Japanese “words for seasons” (kigo 季語) were 
completely irrelevant. It is commonly stated that haikai poetry instantaneously compresses 
the perception of the whole world within seventeen syllables. Poetic condensation cannot be 
achieved without picking up the most hidden details from the unexpectedly revealed aspect 
of Nature. And the poets share their poetic experience in the “Mit-einander-sitzung” or the 
mutual session of their gathering and competition. One can easily see there the Japanese 
aesthetic consciousness of Mitsein sublimated in conjunction with “seasonal words,” thereby 
fusing climate and mental state in a particular fūdosei.92 Yet one must be fully aware of the 
danger of such an easy association. The idea of connecting Watsuji’s Fūdo with Yashiro 
Yukio’s detail-enlarging-observation or Takahama Kyoshi’s haikai poetry composed on his 
way to the West naturally runs the risk of uncritically duplicating Watsuji’s swift overlap-
ping way of thinking, which he put into practice in his Fūdo. 
It may be wise, therefore, to conclude by refraining from making any concluding 
remark. To what extent is it relevant to apply the idea of Zeitlichkeit and Raumlichkeit to the 
making of Watsuji’s Fūdo itself? e question should be left open, so as not to be snagged by 
the shaky paradigm Watsuji proposed.93 However, the marginal reliability and the limited 
91 Again, the author uses the term “metaphysics” as Ōhashi Ryōsuke has indicated (Ōhashi 2009, pp. 154–57).
92 For Yokomitsu’s itinerary and the details of the waka poem composition during his maritime voyage, see 
Kojima 2009, pp. 69–82. Takahama Kyoshi, the famous haikai master, took the same ship to Europe, and 
made detailed observations. (See especially Takahama 1936, pp. 136–37.) On the poetical “topos” of their 
experience, see Haga 2010, pp. 355–96.
93 Umesao elaborated his ecological view of civilizations in stiff opposition to Watsuji. The vogue of photo-
journalism represented by Natori Yōnosuke must be taken into account in this precise context. In fact, 
Natori’s debut as a photo-journalist in Berlin coincided with Watsuji’s stay in the same city, while Umesao’s 
photo-documentaries of field-work in the post-War period (both in nomadic areas and in South East Asia) 
were published in the Asahi photo documentation series supervised by Natori. Lack of space, however, 
prevents the author from developing the details of the issue here.
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relevance of Watsuji’s paradigm should now be clear. In this paper the author has tried to test 
the validity of Watsuji’s method in his Fūdo, by using it as a blueprint for the examination 
of his own writing, including Fūdo itself. In the final analysis, it turns out that the crucial 
extent of its validity has been made conspicuous through the application of the “homeopathic” 
(as against “allopathic”) treatment that the present paper intentionally deployed.94
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